Rational secret sharing by Reyzin, Alissa Natanovna
Rational Secret Sharing
by
Alissa Natanovna Reyzin
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Engineering in Computer Science and Engineering
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
August 2007
@ Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2007. All rights reserved.
Author ............ ...... . ................................
Department of Electrical EI ineering and Computer Science
August 10, 2007
C ertified by ...... . .................................
Silvio Micali
Professor
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Arthur C. Smith
Professor of Electrical Engineering
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOiOGY
NOV 13 2008
LI3RARIES
ARCHIVES
-.....

Rational Secret Sharing
by
Alissa Natanovna Reyzin
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on August 10, 2007, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Engineering in Computer Science and Engineering
Abstract
Recent work has attempted to bridge the fields of Cryptography and Game Theory
in order to create more robust protocols that allow for a variety of player types. A
keystone functionality used in cryptography is Secret Sharing. While there are several
well known, efficient protocols that implement Secret Sharing in the Cryptographic
model, designing a Rational Secret Sharing protocol which works in the Game The-
oretic model has proved challenging.
In this thesis, we contrast several recently proposed protocols for Rational Secret
Sharing based on their channel models, utility tolerances, equilibrium types, and effi-
ciencies. We also discuss two more general results bridging Cryptography and Game
Theory that can be used to construct Rational Secret Sharing protocols. Finally, we
highlight several issues of context that influence the ways in which Rational Secret
Sharing protocols might be used.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography and game theory are both fields dedicated to modeling and facilitating
human interactions. Until recently, there was very little work that tried to bridge the
models used in the two fields. We can learn a great deal about designing more robust
and secure protocols by bringing together the strongest aspects of the Cryptographic
and Game Theoretic models.
In this paper, we focus on a keystone cryptographic functionality called secret
sharing. Protocols for secret sharing are widely used in distributed networking and
are vital for implementing secure function evaluation. Several recent papers have
proposed protocols for secret sharing that succeed in the game theoretic model, or in
a combination of the two models. In this paper, we analyze the strengths and weak-
nesses of the proposed protocols and discuss possible directions for future research.
1.1 The Cryptographic and Game-Theoretic Ad-
versarial Models
Traditional cryptographic protocols separate all agents into two categories - good
agents and malicious agents. Proofs of security for such protocols are predicated
on the assumption that agents classified as good will always follow the prescribed
steps. Malicious agents, on the other hand, can act arbitrarily in order to disrupt the
protocol. Because malicious agents may communicate with each other to form secret
coalitions, all the bad agents are often modeled as being controlled by a single entity
called the adversary. A traditional cryptographic protocol guarantees privacy and
correctness even when some percentage of the agents is controlled by the adversary.
In game theory, there is no distinction between good players and bad. Instead,
each participant has utilities for every possible outcome of the game. The players
wish to maximize their utilities and they act rationally in order to do so, based on
their beliefs about the actions of the other players. In order for a rational player to
act as a good player in the cryptographic model would, following the protocol must
be a dominant strategy for her. That is, following the protocol must maximize her
expected utility regardless of the actions of the remaining players.
1.2 The Weaknesses of the Two Models
Neither of the two models encompasses the other. The weakness of the cryptographic
model is that it assumes some subset of the players to be unequivocally good. It
is clear that this assumption is not always reasonable. One can argue that if the
protocol contains no good players, then there is no reason for us to be concerned with
its completion. While this is true in cases of functionalities such as encryption or
signatures, it is not necessarily true for auctions or joint computations the completion
of which accomplishes some social good.
There are several weaknesses of the game theoretic model as well. One weakness
is the assumption that players are always rational. While in some cases an irrational
player can be easily modeled as s rational player with different utilities, this is not
necessarily true for all cases. An irrational player may choose actions randomly during
play which can result in a sequence of actions that are not the rational path to any
of the possible outcomes.
A second weakness of most game theoretic models is that they exclude the pos-
sibility of coalition formation. In most commonly used notions of equilibrium, the
participants reason out their best action based on their beliefs about the actions of
others. There is no discussion as to where these beliefs originate, nor whether these
beliefs can be changed through negotiation or conspiracy. There is also no discussion
of what happens if several players are actually controlled by a single entity.
1.3 Harmonizing the Two Models
We would like to use tools from game theory in order to design cryptographic protocols
that rational people will be motivated to follow. Although our eventual goal is to make
possible a wide variety of protocols for rational agents, in this paper we choose to
focus on a single task. Specifically, we compare and contrast several recently proposed
protocols for rational secret sharing (which we abbreviate as RSS). We believe that
secret sharing is a good representative protocol with which to begin our investigation.
Informally, a secret sharing protocol allows one agent, called the dealer to share
a secret s amongst n other agents in such a way that any m of them can reconstruct
the secret, but any group of fewer than m agents gains no knowledge about s.
There are several reasons why we choose to begin our investigation with secret
sharing. Not only is secret sharing a useful functionality in its own right, it also
enables secure function evaluation. Its many variants, such as proactive secret sharing
and verifiable secret sharing, are often called upon in distributed computing. Finally,
the traditional protocols for secret sharing are both practical and efficient, but it is
easy to see that these protocols fail for rational participants. If we can create robust
protocols for rational secret sharing, we will be well on our way to understanding
general rational multiparty computation.
1.4 The State of the Art for Rational Secret Shar-
ing
The name "rational secret sharing" was first introduced by Halpern and Teague [4] in
2004. Halpern and Teague pointed out that the reconstruction stage of the commonly
used Shamir secret sharing protocol fails for players with certain very reasonable
incentives. Specifically, if all players prefer to learn the secret and also prefer that
others not learn it, then no player will broadcast her share and the secret will never
be reconstructed. Their goal, and the goal of several follow up papers ([14], [131, [15]),
is to design a reconstruction protocol that incentivizes players to act in such a way
that the secret is revealed to everybody.
Independently of Halpern and Teague's work, Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and Shelat
[7] described a protocol for fair SFE using envelopes. The property of fairness means
that either all players receive the result of the computation, or none of the players
do. This is exactly the property that is necessary for a successful RSS protocol. We
discuss in detail how this result can be applied in order to create an RSS protocol in
chapter 5.
In a later work, Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [5] described a method to convert
any mediated normal form game into an unmediated game that uses the ballot box
communication channel. Because rational secret sharing can be described as a medi-
ated game, this result directly translates to an RSS protocol. We further discuss how
to formalize rational secret sharing as a normal form game in chapter 4.
In contrast to [7] and [5], Halpern and Teague use simultaneous broadcast chan-
nels, which are not as powerful as either envelopes or the ballot box, in order to
achieve RSS. However, their protocol has a less robust equilibrium as well as several
other disadvantages. We describe Halpern and Teague's main results as well as the
protocols of Gordon and Katz [14] and Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern [13]
which improved on [4] in chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Game Theoretic Definitions
2.1 Types of Games and Their Equilibria
2.2 Normal Form Games
A normal form game is a game in which all the players move only once and the moves
are concurrent. Each player must choose her move without seeing the moves of others.
There is a finite number of players, and a finite number of actions available to each
one.
Definition 1 (Normal Form Game)
A normal form game is a triple {N, A, F} where:
An action set Ai is a non-empty set which represents the actions available to
player i.
The set E is the set of outcomes of the game: E = {A 1 x A 2 x ... x A }
A payoff function Fi maps an outcome to a number representing a player i's utility:
F = E 4R
N = {1, 2, 3...n} is the set of players.
A = {A 1, A 2 ...An} is an n-tuple of action sets, one for each player.
F = {F1 , F2 ...F} is an n-tuple of payoff functions, one function per player.
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A normal form game is played as follows: Each player i independently selects an
action ai in Ai. After all the actions are chosen, i receives the payoff Fi(a, a2 .... a).
2.3 Extensive Form Games
An extensive form game with perfect information is a game in which players take
turns making moves and the outcome of the game is not determined until all of the
moves are complete. The term "perfect information" refers to the fact that players
are aware of all the actions that occurred previously. In our definition, we allow every
player to make a move at every discrete point in time. This is the most general
notion, since it is always possible to restrict a player's action set to a single action if
no moves are available to him at that time.
Definition 2 (Extensive Form Game with Perfect Information)
An extensive form game is a triple {N, H, F} where:
A history Hi is a sequence of vectors, where the components of each vector ak are
the actions of each player at time k. Each history represents a state that may occur
during game play.
N = {1, 2, 3...n} is the set of players.
H is the set of possible histories of the game. The set H must contain the empty
history e.
A terminal history is a history a , a2...aK E H such that there is no other history
al, a2 ...a K , a K+ E H. A game is over when a terminal history is reached. Let us call
the set of terminal histories Z.
A payoff function Fi maps a terminal history to a number representing player i's
utility: Fi = Z -+ R
F = {F 1, F2 , ...F} is an n-tuple of payoff functions, one for each player.
In order to play an extensive form game, each player must know the actions avail-
able to her at time t. The only way for a player to learn these actions from the game
form above is to search through H for valid histories of length t + 1 that contain the
current history as a subsequence. However, this process may take time exponential in
the length of the game. In order to avoid the problem, we define the functions Pi :H
Z --* Ai which map histories to available actions for player i.
An extensive form game with perfect information is played a follows: each player
i independently selects an action from Pi(e). Each player is then informed of the
current history h. If h is terminal, each player receives utility Fi(h). If h is non-
terminal, each player selects an action from P(h) and the process repeats.
Note that it is possible for an extensive form game to be infinite. A game is infinite
if and only if it has at least one branch that doesn't terminate in any finite number
of steps.
A variation of the extensive form game defined above is an extensive form game
with imperfect information. In such a game, players may not be aware of the actions
taken at prior times by other participants. Informally, each player knows himself
to be in some information set, where an information set consists of one or more
different histories. The player must choose her move with only the knowledge of the
information set. She may not know the true history of the game so far.
2.4 Variations on Normal and Extensive Form Games
In both a normal form game and an extensive form game, it is possible that the
players may not know the utility functions of the other participants. Games where
this is the case are called games of incomplete information. In games of incomplete
information, each player has a type that determines her utility function. The player's
type is known only to herself and not to other players. The types are chosen from
some distribution that is known a priori to all players.
Another common modification to both normal and extensive form games is to
include nature as a player. Allowing nature to make moves represents the entropy
that seeps into the game from the outside world. For example, if you are deciding
which mode of transportation to use to get to work, this can be modeled as a game
with nature: you choose whether to take the train or drive, and nature chooses the
traffic conditions and train delays that you might encounter en route.
2.5 Nash Equilibrium
An equilibrium of a game is an outcome that rational players will be incentivized to
play. The stronger the equilibrium, the more likely rational players are to play that
equilibrium when told to do so by the designer.
The most commonly used equilibrium is called the Nash equilibrium. The essential
intuition behind the Nash equilibrium is that it prevents single player deviations. If
all players are told which Nash equilibrium is being played, and assuming that all
other players stick to their prescribed strategies, it will be irrational for a single player
to play anything other than her assigned strategy.
The notion of Nash equilibrium does not describe how the players agree on the
specific equilibrium to play. Nor does it necessarily prevent other, possibly stronger,
equilibria from being present in the game.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash equilibrium of a normal form game {N, A, F} is an n-tuple of actions a*
with the following property: Vi E N Va E A
F (a* *, a*) > Fj (u, a,)
Similarly, it is possible to have a Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game.
However, instead of an n-tuple of actions, a Nash equilibrium in an extensive form
game consists of an n-tuple of strategies. A strategy for player i specifies which action
i will take at every point in the game.
Let us call the set of all possible deterministic strategies for i Si. Note that for
normal form games, the Ai = Si for all i.
A Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game {N, H, F} is an n-tuple of actions
a* with the following property: Vi E N Vai E Si
Fi(o>, f) > Fi(au,, a)
2.6 e-Nash Equilibrium
A slightly weaker variation on the Nash equilibrium useful for implementing games
using standard cryptographic computational assumptions is the -Nash. Essentially,
this equilibrium guarantees that no player will do more than E better by deviating
from the prescribed strategy. We define the remaining equilibria only for extensive
form games, but it should be clear that normal form games are a subset of extensive
form games, and therefore all equilibria apply to normal form games as well.
Definition 4 (-Nash Equilibrium) For any c > 0 we define an e-Nash equilibrium
as a profile of strategies o* with the following property: Vi E N Vui E Si
Fij(o7, a*) + > Fi(a*i, ai)
2.7 Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strate-
gies
There are instances where a Nash equilibrium is not a sufficiently strong solution
concept. A somewhat stronger solution concept is Nash equilibrium with iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In order for a strategy 7r of player i to be
weakly dominated, there must exist another strategy that yields an outcome no worse
than 7- regardless of what strategies the other players use, and better in at least one
case. Clearly, a rational player will never use a strategy that is weakly dominated, so
we can remove all such strategies from consideration. The strategy profile of a Nash
equilibrium with iterated deletion of weakly dominated only contains those strategies
that survive iterated deletion.
Definition 5 (Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies)
A strategy ai E Si is weakly dominated by strategy Ti with respect to S if and only
if 3ai E S-i
F(o_j,T-) > Fi(a_j, a)
and Va_i E S_i
F(a_-, T) > F (a_-, ai)
The strategies that survive iterated deletion are defined as follows:
Let SO be the set of all strategies for i
Let Sk = {S, S2k, ...S }
Let Si+k be the set of all strategies in Sk that are not weakly dominated with
respect to Sk.
Let SP be the intersection of all the Sik.
Sj' is the set of strategies for i that survive any number of rounds of deletion.
Note that iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is also applicable to
both normal form and extensive form games.
2.8 k-resilient Equilibrium
A stronger notion of equilibrium which is resistant to deviations by coalitions of
players was defined in [13]. Their notion of equilibrium prevents all deviations by
coalitions of k or fewer players, even when the deviation would only benefit one of
the members of the coalition.
Definition 6 (k-resilient Equilibrium) For all INI > k > 0, a k-resilient equilib-
rium of a game {N, H, U} is an n-tuple of actions sigma* with the following property:
VC c N, ICI < k Vac E Sc Vi E C
Fi(*c, ao*) > F(o*c, ac)
2.9 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
The strongest possible notion of equilibrium is the dominant strategy equilibrium. A
dominant strategy is a strategy that yields the best possible outcome no matter what
the strategies of the other players.
Definition 7 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium)
A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy profile a* with the following property:Vi E
NV- cES
F (a*, a_) > F(aoi, ai)

Chapter 3
Basic Cryptographic Tools
In this chapter, we provide formal definitions of secret sharing, digital signatures and
information checking. We also provide protocols for secret sharing and information
checking. We informally sketch the concept of secure function evaluation and some
known protocols for secure function evaluation. Finally, we provide a formalization
of several traditional communication channels.
3.1 Shamir's Secret Sharing Protocol
Secret Sharing protocols were invented simultaneously by Shamir [10] and Blakley
[16] in 1979. Both protocols allow a dealer to share a secret among n participants
such that any m of them can reconstruct the secret, but it is information theoretically
guaranteed that fewer than m participants cannot do so. Shamir's protocol, which is
the more efficient and therefore more commonly used of the two, is described below.
Note that a secret sharing protocol consists of two stages: the sharing of the secret by
the dealer and the reconstruction by the participants. It is implicitly assumed that
the dealer is unavailable when the reconstruction takes place; otherwise the dealer
could simply broadcast the secret to all players when the need for reconstruction
arises.
Definition 8 (Secret Sharing)
A secret sharing protocol consists of a pair of algorithms: Share and Reconstruct.
The Share algorithm takes a bit-string s and two integers n and m and outputs a
vector of n bit-strings sl through sn and some public information P.
Share(s, n, m, k) = (sl, 2 .... Sn), P
The Reconstruct algorithm takes an integer m' and a vector of bit strings S' and
outputs either a bit-string s or the symbol bottom.
Reconstruct(P, m', k, S') = s' V I
The two algorithms satisfy the following properties: Vk Vn Vm < n
Prob[s +- {0, 1 }k; S, P +- Share(s, n, m, k); N - {R : R C {1, 2..n} A IRI _ m};
S +-- Si iff i E N and 0 otherwise ; Reconstruct(P, k, m, S') = s] = 1
And V algorithms A
Prob[s +- {O, 1 }k; S, P ~- Share(s, n, m, k); N ~ {R: R C {1, 2..n} A IRI < m};
S, +-- S, iff i E N and 0 otherwise; A(P, m, n, S', k) = s] : 1/2k
Protocol 1 (Shamir's Secret Sharing)
Share (s, n, m):
* Choose a field F such that IFI > n and IFI > 2k
* choose a random polynomial p over field F of degree m - 1 such that p(O) = s.
* Si = p(i), P = F
When the participants wish to reconstruct the secret, they broadcast all of their secret
shares and then each one runs the Reconstruct algorithm.
Reconstruct(P, m , k, S')
* Field F = P
* calculate p(O) using the formula
m m
p(O)= H Xz - zi(x)
i=1 j=1,ji
and using the first m entries of S' that are not 1.
Shamir's secret sharing protocol as presented above does not tolerate malicious
players, since a malicious player could easily broadcast a false share during reconstruc-
tion and change the output of the interpolation. However, a trusted dealer whose key
is well known can simply sign each share of the secret. The Reconstruct algorithm
could then check that each share is properly signed before using it in the interpola-
tion Since forging a cryptographic signature is extremely difficult, a computationally
constrained adversary will not be able to send out an invalid share without being
caught with overwhelmingly high probability.
3.2 Secure Function Evaluation (SFE)
The notion of Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) was introduced by Goldreich, Micali
and Wigderson in [3] and was based on the two-party work of Yao ([12]). Since then
SFE has become one of the central primitives in cryptography. It allows a set of n
players to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs without compromising
either privacy or correctness. Essentially, an SFE protocol allows the participants to
simulate a trusted party when no such party exists.
We do not present the formal notion of an SFE protocol here, but instead describe
the key requirements in an intuitive manner. We also sketch two commonly used types
of SFE protocols, one based on computational assumptions, the other based on the
availability of perfectly secure communication between each pair of players as well as
a broadcast channel.
Consider a randomized function f(q, q2 ...q) = {ti, t 2...t} where each player i
inputs qi and receives the output ti. An SFE protocol for function f must satisfy two
main properties: privacy and correctness.
* Correctness: Correctness guarantees that the joint distribution of the outputs
{tl, t 2...tn} will be identical to the distribution that would occur if the function
were evaluated by a trusted party.
* Privacy: Privacy guarantees that no player i can learn more about the inputs
of the other players than she would have learned simply from seeing qi and ti.
Privacy can be demonstrated by providing a simulator which can reconstruct
something that looks like i's view of the protocol when given only qj and ti as
inputs.
Another way to formalize an SFE protocol is to view it as emulating an ideal func-
tion evaluation. And ideal function evaluation is one in which each player privately
sends her input to a trusted party, the trusted party evaluates f, and privately sends
each player her output. This evaluation clearly provides the best possible privacy and
security properties we can hope to achieve.
The GMW Protocol
The first SFE protocols were discovered in 1987 by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson.
Their protocols were based on computational assumptions, but did not rely on ei-
ther private channels or a simultaneous broadcast channel. GMW actually described
several closely related protocols with different properties. We list them below:
* The first protocol is secure only against honest-but-curious adversaries. Honest-
but-curious adversaries always follow the stated protocol. However, they may
try to extract information from the communications they are privy to, even
when they are not told to do so.
The protocol is secure against an arbitrary number (up to n - 1) of honest-
but-curious players. This is the case even when all honest-but-curious players
act together under the control of a single adversary. This protocol also has the
property called fairness. Informally stated, fairness is the property that if a
single player finds out her output, all players will do so.
* The second protocol is secure against any number (up to n - 1) of malicious
players. However a malicious player can abort the protocol at any time. This
abort may occur even after some of the malicious players have received their
outputs. Therefore, the protocol does not guarantee fairness. It is possible for
the adversary to receive the function outputs of the players she controls, while
the good players do not receive any information.
* The third protocol is secure against malicious players, but only as long as the
majority of players are honest. This protocol guarantees fairness in addition to
privacy and correctness.
The essential idea behind the implementation of all three of the GMW protocols is
that the players all get shares of the inputs handed to them. They then simulate
a circuit for evaluating the required function on those inputs. At every step in the
evaluation, each player provides a proof that she is acting in accordance with the
protocol. Finally, the participants send their shares of the circuit's outputs to the
respective players.
The BGW Protocol
The BGW SFE protocols are secure without relying on any computational assump-
tions. Instead, the BGW protocols rely on the existence of perfectly secure private
channels between every pair of protocol participants. Due to this assumption, the
BGW protocols are perfectly, rather than computationally, secure with respect to
computationally unbounded parties. The two main protocols described by BGW are
summarized below.
The first BGW protocol is secure only against a minority of honest-but-curious
players. The honest-but-curious players can all work together in order to extract
additional information from the protocol and the protocol is guaranteed to
remain secure in spite of their efforts. This protocol is trivially fair, since
honest-but-curious players can not abort the protocol.
* The second BGW protocol is secure against an arbitrarily malicious adversary
as long as the adversary controls fewer than n/3 of the participants. In addition,
the protocol is fair, in the sense that if any player receives her function output,
all players must receive their shares.
For implementation details of the original BGW protocol see [1].
3.3 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are a tool for data authentication. In order for player A to be
able to authenticate a piece of information using digital signatures, she must publish
something called her public key, to which she holds the corresponding secret key.
Any player who has A's public key can verify that the signature is hers, but no one
can forge the signature, except with a probability that is exponentially small in the
security parameter.
All digital signatures rely on computational assumptions. For example, a common
assumption that is sufficient in order to construct digital signatures is the existence
of trapdoor permutations. The security of digital signatures is also dependent on the
existence of some known upper bound on the computational power of the forger.
The now standard definition of digital signatures was first introduced by Gold-
wasser, Micali and Rivest [18] in 1988.
Definition 9 (Digital Signatures)
We denote a sequence of k ones by 1k .
A digital signature is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Generate,
Sign, Verify).
The Generate algorithm takes a positive number k in unary notation and returns
two strings a public key Pk, and a secret key Sk.
Generate(1k) = (Pk, Sk)
The Sign algorithm takes a message m to be signed and a secret key Sk and outputs
a signature s.
Sign(Sk, m) = s
The verify algorithm takes a message m, a signature s and a public key Pk and
outputs either a true or false value.
Verify(m, s, Pk) = bool
The three algorithms satisfy the following properties: Vk
Prob{ (Pk, Sk) -- Generate(lk); m <-- {0, 1}k; s +-- Sign(Sk, m) :
Verify(m, s, Pk) = true} = 1
and Vc 3ko Vk > ko Vk V probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A
Prob{(Pk, Sk) +- Generate(lk); m <-- {0, 1 }k; s +- A(Pk, m, Ik)
Verify(m, s, Pk) = true} < 1/k'
In order to see examples of digital signatures satisfying the definition above, see
[19], [20], and [17]. In the rest of this paper, we will refer simply to digital signa-
tures without specifying the protocol we are using. Any signature which satisfies the
definition above will be sufficient.
3.4 Information Checking
Rabin and Ben-Or's [9] protocol for information checking was invented as an alter-
native to digital signatures for use in secret sharing protocols. This protocol allows
several participants to verify the validity of another participant's data.
An information checking protocol allows a dealer to give data d to player A and
verification data to player B in such a way that player A can prove to B that she
received d from the dealer. However, B does not have any information about d until
A chooses to reveal it. Information checking does not have the versatility of digital
signatures, but is information-theoretically secure instead of being computationally
secure. In addition, Rabin and Ben-Or's protocol is far simpler and more efficient
than any known digital signature.
Definition 10 (Information Checking)
An information checking protocol consists of a triple of algorithms (Generate,
Share, Verify).
Generate takes in the positive integer k in unary notation and output some com-
mon information I.
Generate(1k) = I
Share takes in a value between 1 and 2 k and the common information I and outputs
a some check information h and verification information v.
Share(d, I) = h, v
Verify takes in a value between 1 and 2 k d, common information I, check infor-
mation h and verification information v and outputs either true or false.
Verify(d, I, h, v) = bool
The algorithms must satisfy the following properties: Vk
Prob{I +- lk; d +- 0, Ik; h, v +- Share(d, I) : Verify(d, I, h, v) = true} = 1;
and Vk V algorithms A
Prob{I +- lk; d +- 0, 1k; h, v +- Share(d, I) : A(I, v, 1k ) = d} < 1/ 2 k
Protocol 2 (Rabin and Ben-Or's Protocol for Information Checking)
Generate:
* Generate a field F that has at least 2k elements. I = F
Share:
* Choose two random numbers b Z 0 and h in the field described by I
* compute d + bh = c.
* the verification information v = (b, c)
Verify:
* get b and c from verification information v.
* if d + bh = c output true. Otherwise output false.
Note that because A does not know which verification data B has, and the verification
data is chosen randomly and uniformly, the probability of A being able to lie about d
and not get caught is indeed exponentially small in k.
3.5 Communication Channels
In real life, people have many ways to communicate with one another including on
the phone, by email, face to face, or through letters. Each of these communication
channels has different properties. In order to be able to discuss the relative strengths
and weaknesses of several communication channels, we must formalize the notion of
such a channel.
A communication channel is a trusted party that implements a small set of func-
tionalities. Each channel is capable of carrying out one or more functionalities. Some
of the functionalities are invoked at a player's request and others occur regardless of
player actions at every discrete time t.
A functionality's input and output is described by a set of player-input pairs
(i, d). An input pair (i, d) represents information d privately handed to the trusted
party by i. An output pair (i, d) represents data d handed privately to player i.
The functionality may also store certain information, as well as computing on the
information it receives.
We denote the set of participants by N.
Definition 11 (Broadcast Channel) The broadcast communication channel is a
party that carries out the single functionality cast.
cast{(i,p)} : output {(j, (i,p))Ij E N}
The functionality cast is carried out when any player invokes it. Intuitively the
broadcast communication channel is identical to a player standing up in a room with
all the other participants and making an announcement.
Definition 12 (Private Channels) The private channel model also consists of a
single functionality that can be invoked by any player at any time. We call the func-
tionality tell.
tell{(i, (p,j))} : output {(j, (i,p))}
Intuitively, this functionality is equivalent to player i passing a note to player j
out of sight of all other players.
Definition 13 (Simultaneous Broadcast Channel) The simultaneous broadcast
communication channel carries out two functionalities. The first functionality is store,
which is carried out whenever a player invokes it. The second functionality is castAll
which is carried out at every discrete time step t. The trusted party maintains a set
S which is empty at time 0.
S.add(e) adds the element e to the set S
S.clear() makes S into 0
store{(i,p)} : S.add((i,p)), output 0
castAll : output{(j, S)lj E N}, S.clear()
Intuitively, this channel is equivalent to every player independently placing infor-
mation into an envelope marked with her name and a trusted party opening all of the
envelopes.
Definition 14 (Envelope Channel)
An envelope communication model consists of the functionalities store, retrievePrivately,
retrievePublicly and pass. The trusted party maintains a counter C and a set S of
pairs ((i, p), 1) where i is a player, p is some data and 1 is a numerical identifier which
is empty at time 0.
e.getData() outputs the first element of entry e.
e.changeOwner(j); changes e = ((i,p),l) to ((j,p),l)
S.add(e) adds the element e to the set S
S.clear() makes S into 0
S.get(l) returns the element S in which the second entry is 1
S.remove(l) removes the element of S in which the second entry is 1
store{(i,p)} : S.add(((i,p), C)), C = C + 1 output {(j, "i created envelope C - 1")1
jE N}
Intuitively, this functionality corresponds to sealing some secret data into a spe-
cially marked envelope in plain view.
retrievePrivately(i, 1) : output {S.get(l).getData, (j, "i privately opened envelope 1")
jj e N)}; S.remove(l)
Intuitively, this functionality corresponds to opening an envelope in such a way
that everyone knows you opened it, but only you see the data inside.
retrievePublicly(i, 1) : output {(j, (S.get(l), "i opened envelope l"))IJ E N}; S.remove(l)
Intuitively, this functionality corresponds to opening an envelope publicly.
pass(i, (1, j)) : output {(k, " player i passed envelope 1 to player j ")Ik E N};
S.get(l) .changeOwner(j)
Intuitively, this functionality corresponds to passing an envelope across the table
to another player in plain view.
Definition 15 (Ballot-Box Channel)
We do not formally describe the Ballot-Box channel here. A technical definition
is given in [5].
Intuitively, a Ballot-Box channel model consists of envelopes, which are formalized
above, and an envelope randomizer called the ballot box. In this model, envelopes come
in two sizes, small and large. A player may:
e Place some secret data into an envelope.
* Open an envelope privately
* Open an envelope publicly
* Pass an envelope to another player
* Place up to 5 small envelopes into a large envelope. The envelopes will remain
stacked in the order in which they were originally placed.
* Randomize at most 5 envelopes of the same size in such a way that all play-
ers know the envelopes have been randomized, but no one knows the resulting
permutation.
Moreover, the ballot box model makes the strong assumption that no communication
channels other than the specified, publicly viewable ones are available to the players
during the protocol.
We say that communication channel A is at least as strong as communication
channel B if A can be used to simulate B. Clearly, the ballot box channel is at least
as strong as the envelope channel. Similarly, the envelope channel is at least as strong
as the simultaneous broadcast channel.
Chapter 4
An RSS Scheme Using the Ballot
Box Channel
In this chapter, we describe how the result of Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [5] allows
us to implement a protocol for rational secret sharing. Using the Izmalkov et al.
result, we can transform any mediated normal form game into an unmediated game
which relies on the ballot box channel. Although the Izmalkov et al. result appeared
after Halpern and Teague's original paper on rational secret sharing, we choose to
describe it first because it significantly simplifies the task of designing as RSS protocol.
4.1 The Mediated Game for RSS
In order to create a protocol for rational secret sharing we must first fully under-
stand the mechanism that an RSS protocol implements and the equilibrium strength
guaranteed by that mechanism. In addition, we must decide which assumptions we
are willing to make on the strength of the communication channels, the utilities of
the players, and the information available to the protocol designer. In this section,
we discuss the mechanism that we are attempting to implement and the assumptions
that will allow us to do so. We also discuss issues of context that may arise when the
protocol is executed by real people in the real world.
In phase one of secret sharing, the dealer distributes shares to all the players. In
this phase, the dealer is the only one who acts, and she clearly acts in her own self
interest. Thus, as long as we assume the existence of private channels between the
dealer and each of the players in the share phase of the protocol, we can remove this
phase from consideration and focus on the reconstruction phase. From now on, when
we refer to an RSS protocol, we are referring specifically to the reconstruction phase
of the protocol and not to the share phase.
Because the reconstruction phase requires a single decision from each player, we
can formalize the mechanism for this phase as a normal form game with a mediator.
In the reconstruction phase, each player holds a share of the secret. She has three
choices - she may send the correct share of the secret to the mediator, an incorrect
share of the secret, or nothing at all. The mediator must be able to verify whether
the share of the secret is correct. Note that the mediator is not the same entity as the
dealer and does not know the secret herself. If she did, she could simply send out the
secret to all of the participants without the need to run a multiparty computation.
What should the trusted mediator do? Clearly, if she receives m or more valid
shares, she should compute the secret and broadcast it to all the players. If she
receives fewer than m valid shares, she should not disclose the secret to any of the
players. But how can the mediator distinguish valid shares from invalid ones? We
postpone this question for the next several paragraphs and instead assume that the
mediator is capable of doing so.
We would like to guarantee that every player find out the secret. In order to
make this guarantee, we must restrict the set of possible utilities of the players. For
example, it must be the case that at least m players prefer learning the secret to not
learning it. If this is not the case, fewer than m players will send their secret shares,
and no one will learn anything. This assumption is quite natural; if fewer than m
players want to learn the secret, the secret reconstruction should not be taking place.
If we had a guaranteed way of distinguishing valid shares from invalid ones, the
above assumption would guarantee that sending out their true shares would be the
dominant strategy for at least m players. Secret reconstruction would then be the
dominant strategy equilibrium. However, no guaranteed way of verifying the validity
of a share exists. We discuss several possible imperfect methods below.
4.1.1 Modifying the Utilities to Prevent Lying
The easiest, and least satisfying, way to resolve the problem is to simply modify
player utilities so that no player has an incentive to send a false share. This is the
case if we assume that all players prefer to learn the secret regardless of what other
players learn. This assumption is extremely strong as it does not allow for even one
player with unexpected utilities.
Making this assumption yields a normal form mechanism for m out of n secret
sharing where it is a dominant strategy equilibrium for each player to send out her
real share.
4.1.2 Using Digital Signatures to Prevent Lying
Consider the following modification to the protocol: the dealer uses digital signatures
to sign the shares when she hands them out, and each player sends her signed share
to the mediator. The mediator will only consider a share valid if the signature is
correct.
Because the security of digital signatures is based on computational assumptions,
the use of digital signatures immediately implies that the players must be computa-
tionally bounded.
Even a computationally bounded player has a small probability of succeeding in
forging the dealer's signature. When will a player want to forge a signature? She
will attempt to forge the signature if and only if she wants to disrupt the protocol
more than she wants to learn the secret. Therefore, sending the true secret share
will still be dominant strategy for at least those m players who prefer to learn the
secret. We can now view the the game in the following way: first, each player who
has the incentives to do so uses her bounded resources to attempt to break the digital
signature. Then the normal form game for RSS is played. Depending on whether any
of the players succeed in breaking the signature, the normal form game may end in
everyone learning the secret, in no one learning the secret, or in everyone learning a
false secret.
Everyone can learn the false secret only if someone succeeds in forging the digital
signature. This will happen with probability less than any polynomial in the security
parameter.
So, the dominant strategy for the m players who prefer to learn the secret is to send
their secret share. The dominant strategy for those players who wish to disrupt the
protocol more than they wish to learn the secret is to attempt to forge the signature.
The dominant strategy for all other players is to do nothing. Therefore, there is a
dominant strategy equilibrium which results in all players learning the secret with
extremely high probability.
4.1.3 Using Information Checking to Prevent Lying
Another idea is to use Rabin and Ben-Or's [9] information checking protocol described
in the previous chapter. Instead of receiving a signed secret share, every player will
receive a share d and a verification parameter c as well as verification pairs (bi, yi) for
every other player i.
What happens when a player tries to lie about her share of the secret? With
very high probability, she will be unable to do so, and sending an incorrect share
will be equivalent to sending nothing. With a small probability, sending an incorrect
share may result in the players not reconstructing the secret, or reconstructing an
incorrect secret. Even worse, a coalition of players could lie about their verification
pairs. This would make it impossible for the mediator to tell which player is sending
invalid information.
The easiest way to deal with this problem is to make assumptions about the util-
ities of the players. For example, if we assume that at most m - 1 players prefer
messing up the protocol for everyone to learning the secret, then, with high probabil-
ity, the mediator can figure out which m - 1 players have sent incorrect shares and
ignore those shares.
The game then becomes a normal form game with nature, in which nature may
choose whether a player's invalid share actually looks valid to the mediator. (In
reality, nature's choices are made by the dealer when she chooses the verification
information.) The probability of this occurrence is exponentially small in the security
parameter chosen by the dealer. This also does not change the fact that sending the
correct shares is the dominant strategy for at least m players. Therefore, the secret
recovery has an extremely high probability of success.
The dominant strategy equilibrium in this mechanism is for the m players who
prefer to learn the secret to send their correct shares. The other players may prefer
to lie about their shares, depending on their utilities.
4.2 Turning the Mediated Game into a Protocol
Izmalkov, Lepinski ,and Micali [5] define rational secure computation as a way to
securely and privately simulate any normal form game without using a mediator.
They provide a way to translate any normal form game which relies on a trusted
party into a ballot box protocol which will have exactly the same equilibria. We can
use the Izmalkov et al. result and the normal form game(s) that we just defined in
order to create a ballot box protocol for secret sharing.
4.3 Putting the Game in Context
We have succeeded in formalizing the reconstruction phase of rational secret sharing
as a normal form game (with nature, in one case). However, it is not clear that this
formalization is valid in reality.
For example, one of our unspoken assumptions is that the players must all meet
in the same room at the same time in order to run the protocol. But there is nothing
that prevents m of the players from getting together secretly from the others and
running a secret reconstruction protocol on their own. In this way, it is trivially
possible for m colluding players to find out the secret without sharing it with the
others.
Similarly, while a normal form game is only played one time, there is nothing that
prevents players from running the protocol many times with different subsets of the
players present.
There are two ways that we can avoid these problems of context. One way to deal
with the problem is to make an extremely stronger assumption on the communica-
tion channels. For example, we can assume that our channels are only available by
appointment, and that all the players must be present in order to use the channels.
This would guarantee that the secret can only be reconstructed if all the players are
present. However, this solution seems to go against the spirit of secret sharing. After
all, the main purpose of secret sharing is to allow m players to reconstruct the secret
even if the other players are unavailable or disinterested in the reconstruction.
A similar, but slightly more effective solution is to say that the channels are only
available at a single point in time and that the game takes place regardless of which
players are there at the announced time. We argue that all the players interested in
reconstructing the secret will be present at the announced time, and that if at least m
players are interested, the secret will be reconstructed. All players not present during
the protocol will not learn the secret, but we argue that this is no different from the
original protocol - if a player does not want to learn the secret, he can simply close
his eyes and refuse to look at the output of the protocol.
It is important to realize that these problems of context will be present regardless
of the specific RSS protocol. Unless the players all prefer to share the secret with
everyone (in which case designing a protocol becomes unnecessary) or we make our
communication channels extremely restrictive, m colluding players will always be able
to learn the secret without sharing it with the others.
Chapter 5
An RSS Scheme using Envelopes
In the previous chapter, we saw an implementation of rational secret sharing using the
Izmalkov, Lepinski, Micali result for Rational SFE. We now describe how a perfectly
fair SFE can also be used to implement RSS. Specifically we discuss the perfectly
fair SFE protocol of Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and Shelat [7] which relies on envelope
channels, and several ways that it can be transformed into an RSS protocol. Note
that this result appeared independently from, and about a month after Halpern and
Teague's original paper on RSS.
5.1 Using Fair SFE as a Black Box
Assume that we have a perfectly secure and fair SFE protocol. Let us use it to evaluate
the Shamir's secret sharing Reconstruct function. Clearly, either all players will
receive the output, or no players will. We need not worry about the possibility that
a few players will see the secret while others are prevented from seeing it. Therefore,
our only worry is whether any player will be motivated and able to lie about her
shares of the secret, or to interrupt the protocol.
We can deal with the issue of lying by either modifying utilities, using digital
signatures or using information checking, as described in the previous chapter.
Unfortunately, the fair SFE protocol of [7] allows a single bad player to abort the
protocol. There are two ways to deal with this problem. The first is to make strong
assumptions on the utilities of the players - if every player is motivated to find out
the secret, then no player will ever abort. The second way is to dig deeper into the [7]
implementation of fair SFE and to use the ideas in a non-black box manner in order
to create an RSS protocol that makes fewer assumptions on the player utilities.
5.2 RSS Using Envelopes
Rational secret sharing using envelopes has at its core the secret data testing protocol
described originally in [21] and formalized in [7]. This protocol allows a prover to prove
any public predicate Q about a string s known only to herself without revealing any
other information about the string. The existence of the secret data testing protocol
means that each player can create envelopes containing his secret share which is
digitally signed by the dealer, and prove that the share inside the envelopes is in fact
correctly signed. Once at least m players have submitted their envelopes and proved
that the shares in the envelopes are correct, all envelopes are opened and the secret
reconstructed.
There are several subtleties in the protocol described above. First, it relies on the
fact that players are computationally bounded and cannot forge digital signatures.
Second, the secret data testing protocol has some small probability of error that de-
pends on the security parameter. If the security parameter is small and the advantage
that a player gets from submitting a fake secret share is large, then a rational player
will take the bet and try submit an incorrect share.
More formally, a player will try to submit an incorrect share if and only if this will
increase his expected utility. Let us call the utility that player i receives when everyone
gets the secret UcII, the utility she receives when nobody gets the secret Uone and the
maximum possible utility she receives when she gets the secret but all others either
do not get the secret or get an incorrect secret U. Then we simply need to make
sure that prob (lying successfully) -U + 1- prob (lying successfully) .Uone0  < U ual for
all players. Since the probability of cheating successfully is exponentially small in the
security parameter, it is only necessary that the security parameter be polynomial in
the largest difference between U and Ui t', which is a reasonable requirement.
Note that for this protocol to have an equilibrium that results in secret recon-
struction, the protocol designer must properly set the security parameters based on
both the computational abilities of all the players, and some limits on the differences
between each player's utilities. This means that the protocol designer must be aware
to at least some small extent of the players' types. In addition, even if the parame-
ters are securely set, there is still a practically negligible, but theoretically important
chance that some player will be able to forge a digital signature.
What kind of equilibrium does the protocol sketched above provide? We would
like to say that it provides a dominant strategy equilibrium as long as m players are
interested in learning the secret. This would trivially be the case if we disregarded
the subtleties above. However, if only m players are interested in sharing and they
suspect that some player has forged a digital signature, it may be better for the other
players to keep quiet, in order to prevent her from learning the secret while they do
not.
If the players trust the protocol designer to have properly set the security para-
meters, they should believe that the probability of forgery is exponentially small, as
is the probability of tricking the SDT protocol. Therefore, in expectation, each of
the m players will still be better off if they send out a valid share. Instead of simply
sending their share, the dominant strategy for some of the m players may be: first
try to forge a digital signature. If you succeed, send the false share. Otherwise, send
your actual share.

Chapter 6
RSS Protocols using Simultaneous
Broadcast and Private Channels
Halpern and Teague [4] were the first to identify the problem of rational secret sharing
and to describe a protocol for it. Their work, as well as the follow up works of Gor-
don and Katz [14] and Abraham, Dolev, Gonen and Halpern [13] used simultaneous
broadcast and private channels in order to implement RSS.
6.1 The Contributions of Halpern and Teague
One of Halpern and Teague's main contributions was to identify rational secret shar-
ing as a functionality that can provide a great deal of insight into combining the
cryptographic and game-theoretic realms. They also contributed two main techni-
cal results concerning RSS. The first result is a proof that there does not exist any
protocol for RSS that has a fixed running time and uses simultaneous broadcast
communication channels. The second is a basic randomized protocol for RSS in the
simultaneous broadcast channel model.
6.1.1 Impossibility of Fixed Running Time RSS Protocols
Halpern and Teague show that certain types of rational secret sharing protocols do
not exist. Their impossibility result demonstrates that there are no RSS protocols
which satisfy the following requirements:
* The set of strategies prescribed by the dealer is an equilibrium at least as strong
as a Nash equilibrium with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
* The channels used by the players during reconstruction are no stronger than
simultaneous broadcast and private channels.
* There is a commonly known upper-bound on the number of rounds in the pro-
tocol.
* The range of incentive structures for which the protocol is an equilibrium in-
cludes at least one structure in which all players prefer to learn the secret (no
matter what else occurs) and prefer to prevent others from learning it.
They also claim that their impossibility result applies to all two-player protocols, but
Gordon and Katz [14] demonstrate that this is not the case.
We do not present the formal proof of the impossibility result in this thesis, but
the intuition behind the proof is as follows:
* Assume that every player prefers all outcomes in which she learns the secret to
all outcomes in which she does not. Further assume that every player prefers
that as few as possible of the other players learn the secret.
* Consider any strategy that instructs players to send out valid information during
the last round of the protocol. Clearly, this is weakly dominated by not sending
anything during the last round of the protocol, since sending out information
can only help other players learn the secret.
* Because all strategies in which useful information is sent out in the last round are
weakly dominated, every player knows that no player will send any information
in the last round. Therefore, the next to last round effectively becomes the last
round.
* Every round of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies removes those
strategies in which information is sent during the last round, and therefore
effectively removes the last round itself. After many rounds of iterated deletion
of weakly dominated strategies, the only remaining strategy for any player will
be to send nothing in any round. This clearly cannot lead to every player
reconstructing the secret.
6.1.2 The Outline of the Protocol
In order to demonstrate that RSS is still possible, Halpern and Teague propose a
randomized protocol that allows m out of n secret sharing for any m, n > 2. We
choose not to describe the details of Halpern and Teague's protocol, since later pro-
tocols achieve results which are significantly stronger by using similar methods. The
protocol's main properties are summarized below.
Halpern and Teague first describe a 3-out-of-3 RSS protocol and then use it to
create any m-out-of-n protocol where m is at least 3. They do this by splitting the
players into 3 groups and choosing one player in each group as a leader. All players
in the group use private channels in order to send their shares to the group leader.
The three group leaders then conduct the reconstruction protocol. The last stage of
the protocol is one in which the group leaders broadcast their shares, and therefore
all players learn the secret.
The 3-out-of-3 RSS protocol proceeds in rounds. Each round begins with the
three players in possession of three valid secret shares signed by the dealer. With
some probability, the secret is shared. If the secret is not shared in a given round,
the dealer must send out new secret shares and a new round begins.
6.1.3 Limitations of the Halpern and Teague Protocol
We list the main limitations of the Halpern and Teague protocol.
1. The Halpern and Teague RSS protocol requires the dealer's presence during
secret reconstruction. This begs the question as to why we are bothering to
run an RSS protocol at all. If the dealer is present at all times, why should she
not simply broadcast the secret to everyone whenever she wants the players to
learn it? Halpern and Teague do not provide a satisfactory answer.
Moreover, the protocol requires that the dealer have a private channel to every
player during the course of the protocol, and that the dealer distribute valid
shares to all the players. These assumptions are stronger than the basic broad-
cast channel assumption necessary in order for the dealer to simply tell everyone
the secret whenever she wishes to do so.
2. The equilibrium provided by the protocol is a Nash equilibrium with iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies. However, it is not the only Nash
equilibrium in the game. While the protocol designer can instruct players to play
specific strategies, there is no guarantee that rational players will not deliberate
and then settle on a different equilibrium.
3. The protocol strategies are an equilibrium only if all players prefer learning
the secret to not learning it. This means that the protocol cannot tolerate
even a single player who is uninterested in learning the secret, is irrational,
or has unexpected utilities. More formally, the protocol makes the following
assumptions:
* A player's utility function depends only on which players learn the secret.
Let us denote by S the set of players that learn the correct secret. Then if
u and u' are two outcomes such that S(u) = S(u'), F(u) = Fi(u') for all i
* Every player prefers any outcome in which she learns the secret to one in
which she does not. If i E S(u) and i § S(u'), F(u) > F(u').
4. The protocol is not resistant to coalitions. Recall that in an m-out-of-n secret
reconstruction protocol, the ;players are divided into three groups, and each
player sends her share to her group leader. Consider what would happen if the
three group leaders were in coalition. Clearly, once they have m secret shares,
they could simply forgo the protocol entirely and reconstruct the secret without
giving it to any of the other participants.
5. The protocol designer must be aware of the incentives of the players in order
to choose parameter a, which determines the probability with which the secret
will be reconstructed at each round. a is chosen such that for all players i if
S(u) = i and S(u') = 0 and S(u") = N
a2  (1 - a 2 )2 F (u) + • F (u) < F(u").
a2 + (1 - a) 2  a 2 + (1 - )2
Not only must the dealer know enough about the incentives of all the players
in order to choose a sufficiently small a, she must also choose a sufficiently
large a in order for the protocol to be practical. Because the protocol will
run in expected 5/a 3 rounds, the protocol designer must choose an a that
both guarantees the prescribed strategies to be an equilibrium and results in a
protocol with a reasonably quick expected running time.
6. Halpern and Teague's protocol relies on secure digital signatures in order for
the players to know that the reconstructed secret is the same secret that was
distributed by the dealer. There are several troubling implications of using
digital signatures that Halpern and Teauge do not make explicit.
* In order for the players to verify the dealer's signature, they must know
the dealer's public key in advance, or must receive the public key from the
dealer when they receive their shares.
* Because the security of digital signatures is based on computational as-
sumptions, the use of digital signatures immediately implies that the play-
ers must be computationally bounded. This is an assumption that is not
needed for any other aspect of the protocol.
* Digital signatures are not perfectly secure. Even a computationally bounded
player may, with a very small probability, be able to forge the dealer's dig-
ital signature and therefore send out a false share of the secret. This could
cause all other players to reconstruct an incorrect secret, while the player
who commits forgery learns the true secret. Therefore, it is quite plausible
that rational players with the the types of utilities described above would
attempt to forge the signature. The equilibrium strategy for every player
motivated to forge the signature then becomes to first attempt to forge the
signature, and only follow the protocol if forging does not succeed.
We can now view the the game in the following way: first, each player
who has the incentives to do so uses her bounded resources to attempt
to break the digital signature. Then the players attempt to execute the
protocol. Depending on whether any of the players succeed in breaking
the signature, the protocol may result in everyone learning the secret, in
no one learning the secret, or in everyone learning a false secret.
Everyone can learn the false secret only if someone succeeds in forging the
digital signature. This will happen with probability less than any polyno-
mial in the security parameter. However, it is still a possibility that must
be kept in mind. Moreover, it means that even if players reconstruct the
secret, they can never be perfectly sure that the secret they have recon-
structed is the correct one.
6.2 The Contributions of Gordon and Katz
The main contributions of Gordon and Katz's paper were the following:
* demonstrated that a two out of two rational secret sharing protocol is possible
despite Halpern and Teague's apparent proof to the contrary
* described a significantly simplified protocol for RSS that had stronger properties
than the Halpern and Teague protocol.
* suggested a method for removing the dealer from the reconstruction phase of
the protocol.
We summarize the Gordon and Katz protocol below.
Protocol 3 Gordon and Katz RSS Protocol
We make the assumption that the secret s lies in a commonly known subset G of
some field F. We also assume that there is some parameter 0 chosen by the protocol
designer that is known to the dealer. / is chosen based on the utilities of the players
in such a way that for all players i if S(u) = i and S(u') = 0 and S(u") = N
S3. Fi(u) + (1 - B) - Fi(u') < Fi(u")
1. With probability 3 the dealer distributes Shamir secret shares of s. Otherwise,
she distributes shares of some s' E F/G.
2. Each player has a flag all-honest which is set to true at the beginning of the
protocol. If all-honest is true, each player broadcasts the share she received.
3. If at least m shares were broadcast, each player reconstructs the secret. If the
secret is in G, then everyone knows the secret and the protocol is complete.
4. If all n shares were broadcast, and the secret can be reconstructed but the recon-
structed secret is not in G, then the protocol repeats starting from the beginning.
5. Otherwise each player sets her all-honest to false and stops playing.
Similarly to Halpern and Teague's protocol, this protocol relies on the fact that
all players prefer to learn the secret regardless of anything else that occurs during
the protocol. The equilibrium it provides is a coalition resistant Nash with iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
6.2.1 Replacing the Dealer
Gordon and Katz notice that dealer involvement during the reconstruction phase is
illogical, since a dealer who is present can always directly send the secret to all other
players. To solve this problem, they suggest getting rid of the dealer and replacing
her with a secure function evaluation protocol. This SFE protocol takes the true
shares and, with probability 3, re-share the secret or, with probability 1 - / shares
some s' not in G. It also signs the new shares appropriately. (This requires that all
the players receive shares of the dealer's secret key in addition to the shares of the s).
How does replacing the dealer with an SFE protocol affect the protocol's proper-
ties? Gordon and Katz do not go into detail, but note that there are two options:
the secure function evaluation can be either perfectly or computationally secure.
If it is perfectly secure, then the equilibrium remains the same. If anyone deviates
from her assigned strategy, all the other players stop playing. Therefore, if every
player is motivated to find out the secret, no player will deviate. The only caveat is
that perfect SFE requires secure private channels in addition to broadcast channels.
This is still a major improvement on the protocol of Halpern an Teague, however,
since that protocol requires private channels as well as dealer presence.
Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, Halpern [131 offer a solution that uses computational
SFE which we describe in the next section.
6.2.2 Limitations of the Gordon and Katz Protocol
We consider how the limitations of Gordon and Katz's protocol compare to the limi-
tations of the Halpern and Teague protocol listed above.
1. Dealer presence: this limitation is removed as described above.
2. Equilibrium type: this problem remains unchanged. There are still other equi-
libria present in the game.
3. Utility assumptions: the assumptions on utilities are exactly the same as in
Halpern and Teague's protocol.
4. Lack of resistance to coalitions: Although Gordon and Katz do not define coali-
tion resistance in their paper, the original protocol they provide is a k-resilient
Nash for all k < m. The protocol which does not rely on the dealer's presence
must rely on the BGW SFE protocol described in chapter 2. The BGW SFE
can only handle up to 1/3 of the players being in a coalition.
5. Prior Awareness of Incentives: Although the parameter used in the protocol
changes, the problem of having to know players' incentives in advance remains.
In the case of Gordon and Katz protocol, the designer must choose a parameter
3 described above such that for all players
3 - F(u)+ (1 - B) -F (u') F (u")
p also cannot be chosen to be extremely small, because the protocol will take
an expected 1/Q rounds.
6. Reliance on computational assumptions: This limitation remains, since players
still need to use digital signatures in order to verify the validity of shares sent
by others.
6.3 The Contributions of Abraham, Dolev, Gonen,
and Halpern
Abraham et al. wrote their paper concurrently with Gordon and Katz and their
contributions were similar. Their main contributions were:
* demonstrated that two out of two secret sharing was possible
* defined k-resistant equilibria and demonstrated that their protocol was resistant
to coalitions
* Described how to remove the dealer using computationally secure SFE and
e-Nash equilibria.
* used information checking to create a protocol with constant expected running
time for k < m < n - k
* discussed how to deal with players who have unexpected utilities
* described an RSS protocol that doesn't require the dealer to be aware of player
utilities for k < m < n - 2k.
The basic Abraham et al. protocol is almost equivalent to the Gordon and Katz
protocol. The main difference is that they distinguish the trusted mediator used
during the protocol reconstruction from the dealer. This distinction makes it easier
to replace the mediator by an SFE protocol, since the SFE protocol need not have
any special knowledge. They use digitally signed shares so that the mediator can
confirm she is receiving a valid share.
Protocol 4 Abraham, Dolev, Gonen and Haleprn RSS Protocol
The protocol assumes that the secret s = 0 lies in a field F. It also assumes
that there is some parameter 3 chosen by the protocol designer based on participating
players' utilities that is known to the mediator.
1. The dealer distributes digitally signed Shamir secret shares of s.
2. Each player has a flag all-honest which is set to true.
3. Each player sends his share of the secret to the mediator.
4. If at any point in the game the mediator does not receive all the appropriate
messages from all other players, she stops playing.
5. With probability 0 the dealer re-shares the secret. Otherwise, she sends out
secret shares of 0.
6. All players who have all-honest set to true broadcast the secret.
7. If at least m shares were broadcast, each player reconstructs the secret. If the
secret can be reconstructed and it's not 0, then everyone knows the true secret
and the protocol is complete.
8. If all n shares were broadcast, and the secret can be reconstructed but the recon-
structed secret is 0, then each player sends an acknowledgement to the mediator,
and we return to step 5.
Otherwise each player sets her all-honest to false and stops playing.
The protocol above is resistant to coalitions of size m - 1 and runs in time linear
in 1/3.
Abraham et. al. do not mention the possibility of some player forging a digital
signature. However, as long as n > m a forgery would result in the polynomial being
impossible to interpolate, and no-one learning the secret. And if n = m, then it will
result in everyone learning the incorrect secret. Because the original secret shares are
never broadcast, player i cannot learn s and prevent others from learning it even if
she forges a digital signature.
6.3.1 Constant Round RSS
Let k be the size of the coalitions we want to be able to tolerate. Assume that
k < m < n - k. Then it is possible to use information checking in order to create a
two round protocol for RSS.
We modify the protocol as follows:
* The mediator chooses a field F from which the polynomial's coefficients are
drawn so that IF > 1/0 where 6 is a security parameter dependent on the
players' utilities.
* The mediator re-shares the real secret with probability 1/2
* In addition to distributing the re-shares of the secret, the mediator sends out
a check information for every player to be able to check every other player's
share.
Assume that some coalition of k players tried to send incorrect shares. Because
k < n - m there will always be sufficiently many correct shares sent out to guarantee
that secret reconstruction is still possible. The only question is whether the players
will be able to distinguish correct shares from incorrect ones. Our information check-
ing protocol guarantees that this will be the case with extremely high probability.
Therefore if / is set correctly, no coalition will have incentive to deviate from the
prescribed protocol.
6.3.2 RSS Without Knowledge of Utilities
Let k be the size of the coalitions we want to be able to tolerate. Assume that
k < m < n - 2k. Then it is possible to use Reed-Solomon unique decoding (ref)
in order to create a two round protocol for RSS without relying on the protocol
designer's knowledge of player utilities.
Specifically, the protocol remains identical except that the mediator re-shares
the secret with probability 1/2, and the players are instructed to use Reed-Solomon
unique decoding when reconstructing the polynomial.
6.3.3 Replacing the Mediator
Abraham et al suggest replacing the mediator with an SFE protocol. They argue
that if the SFE protocol is perfectly secure, the players will have the same incentives
to follow the correct protocol as they did earlier: any deviation will either not affect
the outcome, or will cause everyone to find out an incorrect secret, or no secret at
all. Therefore, coalition members will have no incentive to deviate, but will act in an
honest-but-curious manner.
There are several well known SFE protocols that can tolerate some proportion of
honest-but-curious members. The BGW protocol is perfectly secure and can handle
k < n/2 honest but curious members. However, in order to be able to handle a
coalition of more than half the players, it is necessary to make some cryptographic
assumptions.
The GMW protocol can handle up to n - 1 honest but curious players. However
the GMW protocol is based on computational assumptions and is therefore only
computationally secure. This means that players have a small probability of being
able to act in a way different from that specified by the protocol and not get caught.
Notice that this is essentially the same problem as limitation 6 in both the Halpern
and Teague and Gordon and Katz protocol.
Although it is impossible to remove the probability of error when cryptographic
assumptions are used in the protocol, Abraham et al. succeed in formalizing the way
in which the equilibrium is effected by the imperfection of cryptography. Instead of
a k-resilient Nash equilibrium, they claim their protocol provides a k-resilient E-Nash
for any E, where E depends on the security parameter of the cryptography and on the
utilities of the players.
Consider a player who attempts to break a computational assumption. If the
player doesn't succeed, clearly she can not do better than to follow the prescribed
protocol. If she does succeed, she might be able to do something different and receive
a significantly higher utility. Let us assume that we know an upper-bound b on the
utility that any player receives for any outcome in which she breaks the cryptography.
Then if a player's probability of breaking the cryptography is E', the total expected
utility she gains from deviating is at most bc'. Similarly, if a coalition of k players
attempts to break the cryptography, their probability of doing so will be at most
kbepsilon'.
6.3.4 Dealing with Players with Unexpected Utilities
Just as this protocol allows us to handle coalitions of players, it also allows us to
handle a small number of players with unexpected utilities. These players are not
irrational, but they may, for example, prefer not to learn the secret, or prefer that
only some other player j learn the secret.
Because we now wish for the protocol to be able to tolerate a coalition of k players
as well as t players with arbitrary utilities, and because the t players could always
choose to send their shares to the coalitions members, it is clear that t + k must
replace k in all bounds for the protocol variations described above. The mediator (or
SFE) can then be instructed to continue play as long as at least n - t players send
their shares.
We do not describe the details of the results pertaining to players with unexpected
utilities. See the original paper [13) for more information.
6.3.5 Limitations of the Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern.
Protocol
We consider how the limitations of the Abraham et al. protocol relate the limitations
of the two protocols presented earlier in this chapter.
1. Dealer presence: this limitation is removed as described above.
2. Equilibrium type: although the type of equilibrium prescribed by the proto-
col differs from a basic Nash as described above, the problem remains - there
are other equilibria in the game that are at least as strong as the equilibrium
prescribed.
3. Utility assumptions: this protocol can tolerate a small number of players with
unexpected utilities, as described above. The utilities of the remaining players
are required to have the same structure as in the earlier protocols.
4. Lack of resistance to coalitions: This protocol is resistant to coalitions of size
up to n - 1.
5. Prior Awareness of Incentives: The protocol designer still needs to be aware
of the incentives in the original protocol in order to properly choose P. In the
two-round protocol, awareness of incentives is used to choose the size of the
field for the information checking protocol. Finally, some limited awareness of
incentives is necessary in order to choose appropriate security parameters for
the cryptography in the GMW SFE protocol.
6. Reliance on computational assumptions: The protocol which uses the GMW
SFE in order to eliminate the dealer still relies on computational assumptions,
as well as on the players being computationally bounded. In contrast to prior
papers, the equilibrium is correctly formalized as an e-Nash. The protocol that
uses information checking instead of digital signatures and the BGW SFE is
less powerful, but avoids computational assumptions.
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